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SEC RULE 14A-8(I)(5): IS IT STILL RELEVANT?  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 14a-8 (the Rule) requires that public companies include pro-
posals submitted by shareholders in their proxy statement.1 A company 
may, however, exclude a proposal on one of thirteen substantive grounds.2 
While the Rule permits owners and managers to debate business activities 
of the company, the exclusions prevent shareholders from usurping man-
agement’s role in the corporation.3 As part of this approach, subsection 
(i)(5) allows for exclusion of proposals that are not “significantly related 
to the company’s business.”4  
First adopted in 1972, the exclusion sought to limit the reach of the 
shareholder proposal rule to initiatives deemed irrelevant to the company’s 
business.5 Companies could exclude matters that implicated an insignifi-
cant segment of the activities of the company.6 The provision, however, 
raised difficult interpretive issues.7 
The concept of “significance” had a both a subjective and objective 
component. As a subjective matter, a proposal could have considerable 
importance even if involving only a small amount of the company’s busi-
ness. Uncomfortable with assessing the qualitative importance of a pro-
posal, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission or 
SEC), at various times over the history of the exclusion sought to impose 
  
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).    
 2. Id. 
 3. Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Ve-
hicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 374-
85 (2006) (discussing the history of shareholder proposals related to corporate social responsibility 
and citing Phillip R. Stanton, SEC Reverses Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 
982 (1999)). 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(5) (2012). The proposal may be excluded from corporate proxy 
materials where it  “relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total 
assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross 
sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's busi-
ness.”  
 5. Exchange Act Release No. 34-9784, 1972 WL 125400 (Sept. 22, 1972). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Interview with [William] Bill Morley conducted by Mary Beach, Peter Romeo, Paul Belvin, 
and David Martin, (June 11, 2003) available at: SEC Historical Society, 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collec-
tion/oral-histories/morley061103Transcript.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). Mickey Beach was Asso-
ciate Director of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Peter Romeo was Chief Counsel of the 
Division of Corporation Finance, Paul Belvin was Director of the Office of Small Business Policy, 
and David Martin was an attorney with the SEC. William Morley was Deputy Chief Counsel of the 
SEC. In the interview, Bill Morley explains that prior to 1971 no-action letters were not publicly 
available as the Freedom of Information Act did not yet exist. Consequently, only large firms were 
able to archive examples of no-action letter decisions from their own client files. Once the letters 
became publicly available, he notes that questions arose over different Staff interpretation to substan-
tially similar fact patterns.) 
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objective criteria, typically judging significance on the basis of a percent-
age of the company’s assets or earnings. The approach, however, was gen-
erally unsuccessful. Even small portions of a company’s business could 
implicate public policy concerns.  
This article will first examine the administrative history of Rule 14a-
8(i)(5). The paper will also consider Staff interpretation of the provision, 
particularly the efforts to define “significant.”8 This will include an exam-
ination of no action letters after 2000. Finally, the paper will suggest some 
reforms in the Staff interpretation of the exclusion.  
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE RELEVANCE EXCEPTION 
Early History of Social and Political Proposals 
Congress delegated authority to the SEC to enact proxy rules as part 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 The Commission adopted the 
shareholder proposal rule in 1942.10 The rule required companies to “in-
clude in management proxy statements proposals intended to be presented 
by a stockholder which are a proper subject for action.”11 Proper subject 
was defined as “proposals which related directly to the affairs of the par-
ticular corporation and not proposals with general political, social, or eco-
nomic matters.”12  
The “proper subject” language was addressed in Peck v. Greyhound 
Corp.13 A shareholder requested the issuer include in proxy materials a 
proposal seeking to end segregated seating on buses in the South.14 The 
Peck  court upheld the company’s right to exclude the proposal as not a 
  
 8. The SEC renumbered the relevance exception over time. From 1972 to 1976, the rule was 
numbered 14a-8(c)(2)(ii). During that period, the rule specified “(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
the management may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its proxy statement 
and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances: (2) If the proposal: (ii) consists of a 
recommendation, request, or mandate that action be taken with respect to any matter, including a gen-
eral economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar cause, that is not significantly related to the 
business of the issuer or is not within the control of the issuer.” Beginning in 1976, the SEC renum-
bered the exception as 14a-8(c)(5) Insignificant Matters. “(c) The management may omit a proposal 
and any statement in support thereof from its proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the 
following circumstances. (5) If the proposal deals with a matter that is not significantly related to the 
issuer’s business.”  
 9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp. (2012). 
 10. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347 (1942). Rule X-14A-7 (currently Proxy Rule 14a-8) 
addressed the concern that proxy materials could be misleading by requiring the inclusion of share-
holder proposals in proxy statements. 
 11. Id. (noting “In the event that a qualified security holder of the issuer . . . intends to present 
. . . a proposal which is a proper subject for action by the security holders, the management shall set 
forth the proposal.” (emphasis added) 
 12. An Opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, 1945 WL 27415 (Jan. 
3, 1945). Courts upheld this position. See generally, Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (upholding exclusion of a proposal requesting that Greyhound Corp. evaluate the 
idea of abolishing segregated busing. This proposal was typical of those submitted during this time 
period which addressed public policy issues).  
 13. 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
 14. Id. 
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proper subject for shareholders.15 The court reasoned the Commission was 
best able to evaluate whether the proposal was excludable.16 Shortly after-
wards, the Rule was amended to explicitly bar proposals “promoting gen-
eral economic, political, racial, religious, social, or similar causes.”17  
Pressure, however, built on the Commission to permit the inclusion 
of proposals that implicated issues of public policy. A series of shareholder 
proposals submitted in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s addressed public 
policy concerns.18 To limit these types of proposals, the Commission 
sought to restrict Rule 14a-8 to initiatives deemed irrelevant to the com-
pany.19 The Commission, therefore, added an exclusion for proposals “not 
significantly related to the business of the issuer.”20 The standard applied 
to all proposals, including those involving “general economic, political, 
racial, religious, social, or similar causes.”21  
The amendment provided no insight into the meaning of “signifi-
cantly related.” As an initial threshold, the Staff required management to 
  
 15. Id. at  681. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Amendment of Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775, 1952 WL 5254 (Dec. 11, 
1952) (also renumbering Rule X-14A-7 Proposals of Security Holders, as Rule X-14A-8.) 
 18. See generally, SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (This case addressed a proposal to a company producing napalm 
during the Vietnam War. The shareholder proposal requested the company amend its certificate of 
incorporation to prohibit  the sale of napalm, except where it  would not be used against human beings. 
The SEC upheld the company’s decision to omit the proposal from its proxy statement and the stock-
holder petitioned the federal court to review the SEC’s decision. The Court of Appeals concluded the 
SEC’s determination was “dubious,” especially since the Commission did not provide the company 
any reasoning for its decision. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the corporation included 
the proposal in the shareholder materials and fewer than 3% of voting shareholders supported the 
proposal. Consequently, the SEC permitted the corporation to exclude similar proposals from proxy 
materials for a three-year period.)  
 19. The SEC proposed these amendments to the Proxy Rules with Proposed Proxy Rules, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-9432, 1971 WL 126135 (Dec. 22, 1971), to amend Rule 14a-8(c)(2). Rule 
14a-8(c)(2) provided a security holder's proposal may be omitted from the management's proxy mate-
rial “ if it  clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder primarily for the purpose 
of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its management, 
or primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or sim-
ilar causes." The SEC advanced this amendment in order to replace the “subjective terms of the pro-
vision with objective standards and thereby create greater certainty in the application of the rule.” The 
Release continued, “Accordingly, the words "clearly appears," primarily," "purpose," and "promoting" 
have been deleted and the standards "not significantly related to the business of the issuer" or "not 
within the control of the issuer" have been proposed” (emphasis added). This Release was the first 
t ime the SEC used the phrase “not significantly related to the business of the issuer.” The SEC incor-
porated this language into the final proxy rule amendments adopted with SEC Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-9784, 1972 WL 125400 (Sept. 22, 1972). Importantly, the final rule further ex-
panded the application to all proposals submitted, not simply those offered for the purpose of promot-
ing general public policy causes. 
 20. Solicitations of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-9784, 1972 WL 125400 (Sept. 22, 
1972) (renumbering the rule as 14a-8(c)(2)(ii)). In 1976, the Commission split  out the section of this 
rule addressing proposals “not within [the company’s] control” and created a new exclusion: 14a-
8(c)(6) “If the proposal deals with a matter that is beyond the issuer’s power to effectuate.” 
 21. Id. 
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establish the insignificance of the proposal.22 For example, the Staff de-
clined to permit exclusion where management failed to provide evidence 
regarding the financial impact of the proposal on the company’s busi-
ness.23  
The Commission also experimented with a bright line economic test. 
In the context of proposals arising out of the Arab boycott of Israel,24 the 
Staff permitted omission where issuers had “less than one percent of their 
business with Arab nations or with Israel.”25 Throughout the early 1970’s, 
the Staff used the 1% test in the context of other shareholder proposals, 
including those involving human rights, equal employment opportunities 
for women and minorities,26 company investment in South Africa (apart-
heid),27 and the use of infant formula in developing nations.28  
The test was rigidly applied. Where the percentages exceeded the 
bright-line threshold, the Staff was “unable to conclude these figures taken 
as a whole [were] insignificant to the Company’s overall business.”29 
Thus, where the assets of the business in question accounted for more than 
1% but less than 2% of total assets, the proposal could not be excluded.30 
  
 22. Ipco Hospital Supply Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8327 (Aug. 16, 1974) 
(“Although the proposal may be deemed to relate to a social or similar cause, we do not believe you 
have provided sufficient justification for your view that it is not significantly related to the business 
of the company. That is, you have not provided any statistical support for your view that the subject 
matter of the proposal (viz., aid to the Cancer Institute) is not significantly related to the business of 
a hospital supply corporation.” (emphasis added)).  
 23. Compare Standard Oil Company of California, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9859 
(Aug. 30, 1975) (where the company did not provide financial data in support of its assertion the 
proposal, to provide a report on strip mining on the Northern Cheyenne reservation, it was “otherwise 
significantly related” to company operations. The Staff noted, as “a consequence” of not providing 
financial data, the company could not rely on the relevance exclusion.), with Libbey-Owens-Ford 
Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 10926 (Feb. 3, 1976) (where the company provided fi-
nancial data in regard to a proposal to report on the issuer’s operations in Arab countries and Israel, 
the Staff commented on, “ the very small percentage of its overall business operations” and that they 
believed it  “appropriate to focus on percentage figures rather than actual dollar amounts in determining 
the applicability” of the rule.) 
 24. Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L.REV. 
425, 427 (1984) (explaining the “massive number” of proposals related to the Arab boycott necessi-
tated development of a more efficient method of evaluation; thus, resulting in the economic test. See 
article note 72.) 
 25. Id. 
 26. CBT Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9152 (Mar. 7, 1973) (This proposal 
from an individual requested the company fill the next opening on the Board with either a “black” man 
or a woman.) 
 27. Ford Motor Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 12888 (Mar. 14, 1977) (A group 
of religious organizations proposed Ford Motor Company cease operations in South Africa. The Staff 
found although operations in South Africa accounted for less than one-percent of Ford earnings, the 
assets constituted between one and two percent and thus were not excludable under this basis.) 
 28. See e.g., American Home Products, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9172 (Mar. 4, 1975) 
(This proposal requested the company report on the operations related to sales, manufacturing, pack-
aging, and distribution of infant formula. Since the company did not provide any financial information, 
they did not meet their burden and the proposal was not excludable under the Rule.) 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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In Tenneco, Inc., for example, the religious proponents requested a 
report on company land holdings currently being farmed.31 Tenneco as-
serted that the “agricultur[al] activities . . . constitute[d] a relatively small 
portion of the general business of the Company” or less than 2.5% of total 
consolidated revenue and 0.86% of gross income.32 The Staff nonetheless 
denied the requested no action relief.33  
Additional revisions to the exclusion occurred in 1976.34 The Com-
mission deleted the references in the former rule to “economic, political, 
racial, religious, social, or similar causes,” and noted these “illustrative 
references” were “superfluous and unnecessary.”35 The SEC considered, 
but declined to adopt, an entirely objective test, noting, “Many instances 
[occur] in which the matter involved in a proposal is significant to an is-
suer’s business, even though such significance may not be apparent from 
an economic viewpoint.”36 The release conceded that economic data 
could be relevant37 but “the significance of a particular matter to an is-
suer’s present or prospective business depend[ed] upon that issuer's indi-
vidual circumstances, and that there [was] no specific quantitative stand-
ard . . . applicable in all instances.”38  
Proposals continued to be evaluated in part on their economic signif-
icance. In Long Island Lighting Company, an individual investor sought 
an annual report to shareholders on conservation and alternative energy, 
as well as a halt to further development of nuclear power plants.39 The 
Staff reiterated that companies had the burden of establishing that “the 
subject matter of the instant proposal is not significantly related” to their 
  
 31. Tenneco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9273 (Feb. 7, 1975). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Exchange Act Release No. 34-12999 (1976) (noting that the deletion of the list  of general 
causes should not be “construed as an implication that a different standard” would be used in evaluat-
ing shareholder proposals.)  
 35. Id. 
 36. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19602 (July 7, 1976) (The 
Commission noted that these instances included: “proposals dealing with cumulative voting rights or 
the ratification of auditors” and are not typically economically relevant, but are important to security 
holders in their overall evaluation of the company.) 
 37. Id. (commenting, “[we] recognize that there are circumstances in which economic data may 
indicate a valid basis for omitting a proposal under this provision.”) 
 38. Id. 
 39. Long Island Lighting Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 24718 (Feb.5, 1981) 
(Staff noted the issuer failed to provide any discussion of economic significance or provide any finan-
cial information and thus did not meet its burden in asserting Rule 14a-8(c)(5) that the subject matter 
of the proposal was not significantly related to the Company’s business.) But see Peoples Energy 
Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 666100 (Nov. 29, 1994) (This proposal requested the 
issuer eliminate two in-person customer service branches in order to reduce operating expenses. Staff 
noted the Company’s representation that the amounts of revenue, earnings, and assets attributable to 
the two offices was less than five percent and thus was not otherwise significantly related to the Com-
pany’s business.) 
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business and that in this case Long Island Lighting had failed to demon-
strate the lack of “economic significance of nuclear power plants” to its 
business.40  
Consistent with the 1976 revisions, however, the Staff did not always 
apply objective standards. A proposal submitted to Marriott Corporation 
sought to prohibit charitable contributions.41 Although not a large percent-
age of revenues or profits, the Staff declined to permit exclusion.42 The 
Staff reasoned: 
Although the representations made by the Company's counsel as to the 
percentage of revenues and profits represented by charitable contribu-
tions tend to indicate that the subject matter of this proposal is not of 
economic significance to the Company's business, this is not the sole 
consideration under Rule 14a–8(c)(2)(ii). . . . [T]here are many in-
stances in which the matter involved in a proposal is significant to an 
issuer's business, even though such significance may not be apparent 
from an economic viewpoint. Accordingly, in our view the signifi-
cance of this proposal to shareholders would appear to transcend its 
economic impact and thus preclude management's reliance upon 
Rule 14a–8(c)(2)(ii) as a basis for its omission.43 
Formal Economic Test Adopted in 1983 
The attraction of an objective numerical test, however, remained. In 
1982, the Commission proposed amendments that sought to add explicit 
economic standards to the exclusion.44 The proposing release acknowl-
edged that, under the existing interpretation, proposals reflecting “social 
or ethical issues, rather than economic concerns, raised by the issuer's 
business” could not be excluded to the extent “the issuer conduct[ed] any 
such business, no matter how small.”45  
Although recognizing that “a totally objective standard” was not fea-
sible, the Commission suggested amendments that would “incorporate 
economic factors” into the rule.46 A Commission memorandum framed the 
internal Staff discussion around revising this exclusion,  
While we do not propose to change this paragraph, that conclusion is 
a very difficult one. Since the reversal of the so called 1% test in 1978 
there have been complaints [from the issuer community] that there is 
no objective test for exclusion under paragraph (c)(5) and that the pro-
vision no longer provides a viable basis for excluding proposals. As a 
result, issuers have frequently suggested that the staff should revise the 
  
 40. Id. 
 41. Marriott  Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 11078 (Sept.17, 1976). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange 
Act Release No. 19,135, 1982 WL 600869 (Oct. 14, 1982). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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rule to specifically provide that proposals which are not economically  
significant may be omitted, and to establish an objective test for eco-
nomic significance.47 
The final rule allowed for the exclusion of proposals that related to less 
than 5% of a company’s total assets, gross revenue, or net earnings, but 
retained the requirement that they not otherwise be “significantly related 
to the issuer's business.”48 
The exclusion occasionally found its way into court. In Lovenheim v. 
Iroquois Brands, Ltd., shareholders challenged the exclusion of a proposal 
relating to the force feeding of geese as not significantly related to the 
business of the company.49 The court reversed, stating that social concerns 
were significant to a company’s business, and noting the proposal “repre-
sent[ed] a close question given the lack of clarity in the exception itself.”50 
Nonetheless, the court held that “in light of the ethical and social signifi-
cance” of the proposal, it could not be excluded from shareholder proxy 
materials.51 
The amendments notwithstanding, the Staff rarely relied on the ex-
clusion.52 For the most part, the Staff found that proposals involving a 
small percentage of earnings or assets, but that nonetheless raised im-
  
 47. Memorandum from [William] Bill Morley and [Michael] Mike Kargula to Lee B. Spencer, 
Jr., John Huber, and Linda Quinn, (Mar. 18, 1982) regarding “Proposed Revision of Rule 14a-8” 
available at: SEC Historical Society, http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/pa-
pers/1980/1982_0318_MorleyKargula.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). At the time, William Morley 
was Deputy Chief Counsel and Michael Kargula was Special Counsel. Lee B. Spencer, Jr. was SEC 
Director of Corporation Finance, John J. Huber was Deputy Director, and Linda C. Quinn was an 
Associate Director. The memorandum begins by noting “In most instances the problems we are en-
countering are not problems with the rules, but problems with the Staff interpretation of the provi-
sions.” 
 48. Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Re-
lease 34-20091, 1983 WL 33272 (Aug. 16, 1983). The final version of the rule explained this exclusion 
did not apply to “such matters as shareholders’ rights, e.g. cumulative voting.” 
 49. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F.Supp. 548, 556 D.C. (Mar. 28, 1985). 
 50. Id. at  559 (distinguishing this case from Med. Comm. for Human Rights (see supra note 18) 
since the motivation of the proponents in that case was political, although the proposal in both cases 
was economically insignificant. In Lovenheim, the proponent requested a report on the methods used 
by the issuer’s supplier of pâté de foie gras. In both cases, the court held the proposal should not be 
omitted since it  was socially significant.) 
 51. Id. 
 52. The proposals for which the Staff declined to recommend enforcement action in the 1980’s 
included: 1) Iroquois Brands which requested no-action relief for a proposal from attorney Peter Lov-
enheim who asked for a study of the production methods of the company’s pâté de foie gras supplier, 
Iroquois Brands, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45764 (Feb. 22, 1984). 2) Green Mountain 
Power which petitioned for the exclusion of a proposal requesting all company directors disclose per-
sonal and family business interests and political and social contacts, Green Mountain Power Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54071 (Apr. 3, 1985).and 3) United Technologies which requested 
a proposal from the trustee by the New York City Employees Retirement System for increasing and/or 
implementing the MacBride Principles in Northern Ireland not be included. United Technologies 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108923 (Feb. 19, 1987). 
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portant social issues were significantly related to the company’s busi-
ness.53 The Staff did so when the proposal involved important matters of 
public policy, whether disinvestment from South Africa54 or application 
of the McBride Principles.55 
Congressional Oversight of the Shareholder Proposal Process 
Concerns nonetheless arose from the issuer community that the 
Staff’s interpretation of the exclusion “require[d] them to include too 
many proposals of little or no relevance to their business.”56 In response, 
the Commission proposed revisions that sought to “streamline” the rele-
vance exclusion.57 The economic thresholds proposed were to be lowered 
to the lesser of $10 million or 3% in gross revenues or total assets.58 In 
return for the “expanded, economic test,” the Commission proposed the 
elimination of the subjective phrase “otherwise significantly related.”59 
The proposal would “make it easier for companies to exclude economi-
cally insignificant proposals” but would only apply to shareholder “pro-
posals relating to quantifiable matters, such as operations in a specific for-
eign country, a specific product line, or a specific retail store or set of 
stores.”60  
Issuers, however, asserted that “the proposed amendments . . . could, 
in fact, broaden the range, and therefore the number of proposals required 
  
 53. Boeing Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 245652 (Feb. 8, 1989) (This proposal 
requested a report on company activity with a particular supplier known for discriminatory practices. 
The Staff noted “It appears that the proposal relates to operations that may not be of economic signif-
icance to the Company. However, in light of the Company’s business relationship with [the supplier] 
and the social policy issues inherent in the proposal, we are unable to concur in your view the proposal 
is “not otherwise significantly related” to Company business.” (emphasis added.).  
 54. Harsco Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 2622 (Jan. 4, 1993) (This proposal, 
from the New York State Common Retirement Fund, requested the issuer refrain from new or ex-
panded capital investment in South Africa. The Staff noted the proposal was “otherwise significantly 
related” to the Company’s business and could not be excluded using 14a-8(c)(5) [currently 14a-8(i)(5)] 
as a basis for omission.)  
 55. United Technologies, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107707 (Mar. 10, 1987) (This pro-
posal from the New York City Employees’ Retirement System and co-sponsored by the Oblates of 
Mary Immaculate, requested the company implement the MacBride Principles in Northern Ireland. 
The MacBride Principles consist of nine fair employment principles and are considered a corporate 
code of conduct for companies doing business in Northern Ireland.).  
 56. Proposed Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-39093 (Sept. 18, 1997). 
 57. The economic test proposed (but not enacted in the final revision) would have allowed a 
company to exclude proposals relating to matters involving the purchase or sale of services or products 
that represent $10 million or less in gross revenue or total costs, whichever was appropriate, for the 
company’s most recently completed fiscal year. Moreover, an additional economic test lower than $10 
million would have applied if 3% of the company’s gross revenue or total assets (whichever was 
higher), for its most recently completed fiscal year, results in a number lower than $10 million. The 
test would also have been subject to an “override” mechanism where the proposal would be includable 
if at  least 3% of the company’s outstanding voting shares supported the submission of the proposal to 
shareholder vote. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
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to be included in the proxy materials.”61 Commenters further raised con-
cern over the possibility of increased costs to issuers without commensu-
rate benefit to shareholders.62 In particular, issuers expressed that the de-
sign of the override mechanism provided significant benefit to the spon-
sors of social policy-type proposals, which did not have a material effect 
on the corporation.63 As a result, the SEC decided against the streamlined 
version of the relevance exclusion and kept the rule basically the same as 
it had been since 1983.64  
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION OF THE CURRENT RULE 
The failure to adopt the 1997 proposed revisions left in place the sub-
jective standard for interpreting the exclusion. Economic thresholds re-
mained relevant, but proposals still could only be excluded if “not other-
wise significantly related to the company's business.”65 As a result, the 
Staff continued to issue unclear and inconsistent decisions.  
For example, two no action letters calling for a company to reduce 
investments in Israel received differing Staff treatment. The Staff found 
“some basis” for excluding a proposal submitted in 2003.66 Four years 
later, however, the Staff was “unable to concur” that a similar proposal 
could be excluded as “not otherwise significantly related” to the com-
pany’s business.67  
In other cases, the Staff sought to avoid the need to determine the 
significance of a proposal to a company’s business. The Staff largely lim-
ited no action relief to proposals that did not implicate any area of the 
company’s business. To the extent a proposal was “completely unrelated” 
  
 61. P. Alan Bulliner, Comment Letter on SEC Proposed Rule, File No. S7-25-97 (Nov. 13, 
1997) (This commenter went on to state, “The proposed quantifiable economic significance test, for 
proposals relating to the purchase or sale of products and services, of the lesser of $10 million in gross 
revenues or 3% of the higher of gross revenues or total assets, is ludicrous in the context of large 
corporations.”) 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018, 
1998 WL 254809 (May 21, 1998). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Hewlett-Packard Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 122322 (Jan. 7, 2003) (Staff 
found “some basis” for excluding the proposal under 14a-8(i)(5). The proposal requested the issuer 
divest or close offices in Israel and send a letter to the United Nations related to Israel’s violation of 
international human rights in Palestine.).  
 67. Bank of America Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 528626 (Feb. 12, 2007) 
(including Staff response to no-action relief dated Jan. 12, 2007, from proponent requesting company 
“reduce investment in Israel by 5% annually until the State of Israel cease military, economic, and 
political attacks on the Palestine Authority.” Staff was “unable to concur the proposal [was] not oth-
erwise significantly related” to company business, thus requiring its inclusion. The Staff, however, 
allowed for the omission of these proposals under other subsections. See also College Retirement 
Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 1761354 (May 6, 2011) (excluded as ‘ordinary busi-
ness’ under (i)(7)); College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1948395 
(May 10, 2013). Both proposals requested the company end investments in Israel or with companies 
contributing to the Israeli ‘occupation’ of Palestine. Both proposals were excludable under the ‘ordi-
nary business’ exclusion.). 
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to the issuer’s activities,68 the proposal would be excluded even if raising 
an important issue of public policy. Thus, proposals not implicating a com-
pany’s business were excluded despite raising concerns over “forced” la-
bor,69 human embryonic stem cell research,70 investment in Israel,71 pol-
lution,72 and corporate gifts.73  
Nonetheless, the Staff rarely used the exclusion. From 2000 to 2009, 
the Staff allowed for the exclusion of only nine proposals under subsection 
(i)(5).74 In the second decade of the new millennium, the Staff used the 
exclusion even less. Companies sought the exclusion of proposals address-
ing a variety of corporate social responsibility topics. Proposal topics in-
cluded corporate activities in Northern Ireland75 and Sri Lanka,76 and in-
vestments in regions where genocide and crimes against humanity were 
said to occur.77 Companies also proposed excluding proposals addressing 
  
 68. Fleet Services Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 17949 (Jan. 20, 1998) (Staff noted 
in particular “the proposal is completely unrelated to the Company’s business.” The shareholder pro-
posal requested the issuer investigate and publish a report regarding a Korean Airlines crash.). 
 69. BellSouth Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 75812 (Feb. 19, 1997) (The proposal 
requested the issuer adopt policies to ensure it  does not deal in goods or services produced by forced 
or slave labor in China. Staff noted in particular, the Company represented “none of its operations in 
China use products or services produced by forced or slave labor.”). 
 70. See e.g., Proctor & Gamble, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 21919560 (Aug. 11, 2003) 
(The proposal requested the company adopt a policy forbidding human embryonic stem cell research. 
In allowing the issuer to rely on 14a-8(i)(5), the Staff noted the company’s representation that it  
doesn’t perform any human embryonic stem cell research.). 
 71. Hewlett-Packard Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 122322 (Jan. 7, 2003) and 
supra note 67. 
 72. Arch Coal, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 224980 (Jan. 19, 2007) (The proponent 
requested the company prepare a report addressing emissions from the company’s power plant opera-
tions. In permitting the issuer to rely on 14a-8(i)(5) Relevance, the Staff noted the company’s repre-
sentation that it  did not have any power plant operations.). 
 73. Merck & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 3695277 (Jan. 4, 2006) (The proposal 
requested the board adopt a policy banning thank-you gifts to organizations in the People’s Republic 
of China. Staff did not provide an explanation for permitting the company to exclude the proposal 
under 14a-8(i)(5); however, the company asserted the thank-you gifts provided to Chinese organiza-
tions amounted to 0.0001 percent of net income.). 
 74. Of 166 proposals asserting 14a-8(i)(5) relevance, during the 2000’s, 39 were found other-
wise significantly related by the Staff, nine proposals were permitted for exclusion under the relevance 
provision, and 118 were found excludable under other provisions. 
 75. Corning Incorporated, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 6999584 (Feb. 11, 2015) (The pro-
posal requested the board implement or increase activity on eight principles related to religious dis-
crimination in Northern Ireland. Staff was unable to concur the proposal could be excluded under 
either 14a-8(i)(5) Relevance or 14a-8(i)(10) Substantially implemented.) 
 76. The Gap, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 167220 (Mar. 14, 2012) (The proponent 
requested the board institute procedures to end trade with Sri Lanka until the Sri Lankan government 
ceased human rights violations. The Staff noted none of the asserted provisions: 14a-8(i)(3) Violation 
of proxy rules, 14a-8(i)(5) Relevance, or 14a-8(i)(7) Ordinary business operations, could be relied 
upon as a basis for omitting the proposal.)  
 77. JP Morgan Municipal Money Market Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 1511146 
(Apr. 15, 2014) (The proposal focused on company procedures related to investment in companies 
substantially contributing to genocide or crimes against humanity such as occurred in Sudan. Staff 
could not concur the fund could rely on 14a-8(i)(5) relevance although the fund met all the 5% thresh-
old tests.) 
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animal rights, such as the need for cage free eggs,78 animal testing,79 and 
the purchase or sale of furs.80 Proposals related to reporting lobbying con-
tributions and expenditures81 and on pollution caused by company activity 
were also proposed for exclusion.82 During this period, the Staff allowed 
for the exclusion of just one proposal under subsection (i)(5).83  
IV. ANALYSIS  
The shareholder proposal rule has allowed owners to provide to man-
agement with their collective views on corporate matters. Shareholders of-
ten seek to include proposals that implicate matters of important public 
concern. Some of the proposals, however, only implicate, as a matter of 
economics, an insignificant portion of a company’s business. In these cir-
cumstances, the argument can be made that the company’s proxy state-
ment may not be an appropriate vehicle for debating the matter.   
In fact, however, the history of (i)(5) suggests that this is not a par-
ticularly useful basis for determining whether to exclude a proposal. To 
the extent proposals sought to target an uncontroversial aspect of a com-
pany’s business, the idea that the subject matter was insignificant as an 
economic matter made sense. Even if the proposal was implemented, the 
outcome would be immaterial. Yet shareholders seldom submit these types 
  
 78. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 2281670 (June 6, 2011) (Proposal 
from the Humane Society of the United States encouraged the board to phase in the use of cage free 
eggs for Bob Evans restaurants. The issuer asserted 14a-8(i)(3) Violation of proxy rules, 14a-8(i)(5) 
Relevance, 14a-8(i)(7) Ordinary business operations, or 14a-8(i)(10) Substantially implemented, as a 
basis for exclusion. Staff was unable to concur with any of these bases.) 
 79. Revlon, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 1292240 (Mar. 18, 2014) (Proponent re-
quested an annual report disclosing company policy on animal testing. The company requested exclu-
sion under 14a-8(i)(4) Personal grievance, 14a-8(i)(5) Relevance, 14a-8(i)(7) Ordinary business oper-
ations, or 14a-8(i)(10) Substantially implemented. The Staff could not concur that any of these bases 
were appropriate to support the proposal’s omission.) 
 80. Coach, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 3374169 (Aug. 19, 2010) (People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals encouraged the board to enact a policy to ensure no fur products were 
acquired or sold by the company. Coach asserted 14a-8(i)(3) Violation of proxy rules, 14a-8(i)(5) 
Relevance, 14a-8(i)(7) Ordinary business operations as appropriate bases for omission. Staff could not 
concur. Thus the proposal was includable in shareholder materials.) 
 81. Devon Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 748853 (Mar. 27, 2012) (Proponents re-
quested the board prepare a report on company lobbying contributions and expenditures. The issuer 
asserted 14a-8(i)(3) Violation of proxy rules, 14a-8(i)(5) Relevance, and 14a-8(i)(7) Ordinary business 
operations. Staff was unable to concur any were an appropriate basis for excluding the proposal.) 
 82. Arch Coal, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6723091 (Jan. 31, 2013) (The proposal 
by the New York State Common Retirement Fund requested a report on the pollution resulting from 
Arch’s removal of mountaintop land and effective means to mitigate the effects of company activities. 
Staff was unable to concur the proposal could be omitted under 14a-8(b) or 14a-8(i)(5).) 
 83. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6723108 (Feb. 19, 2013) 
(This proposal requested the Company’s board analyze whether Goldman Sachs, as a “person,” could 
run for electoral office. Staff noted the issuer’s representation the Company “currently has no involve-
ment, never has had any involvement, and has no plans to become involved in the business of running 
for political office.”) 
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of proposals. When they do, subsection (i)(5) is unnecessary. The “ordi-
nary business” exclusion guarantees their omission.84  
To the extent that a proposal involves a company’s business and im-
plicates public policy, the percentage of revenues or assets rarely matters. 
The manufacture of napalm, the use of pâté from force fed geese, or the 
sale of weapons, may not have a material impact on a company’s earnings 
but nonetheless can have a significant potential effect on reputation.  
All of this suggests the need to either repeal or substantially narrow 
this exclusion. At most, this exclusion should be limited to matters where 
the company did not engage in the type of business addressed by the pro-
posal. Matters of public policy may be worthy of debate but the debate 
should be centered on companies that engage in the controversial activi-
ties. Other types of proposals can be resolved under the ordinary business 
exclusion, with the degree of impact on the company’s earnings and reve-
nues playing no role in the analysis. 
Kathryn R. Kaoudis† 
 
  
 84. Rule 14a-8(i)(7), 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(7). Indeed, the Staff commonly resolves proposals 
involving the company’s business under the ordinary business exclusion. See e.g., Catellus Develop-
ment Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 517866 (Mar. 3, 2005) (The proposal submitted 
requested the company attempt to trade federal land for coastal property sacred to a Native American 
tribe. The company asserted 14a-8(i)(6) Absence of power/authority, 14a-8(i)(5) Relevance, 14a-
8(i)(4) Personal grievance or special interest, and 14a-8(i)(7) Ordinary business operations. Staff 
found the proposal could be omitted under 14a-8(i)(6) and did not find it  necessary to address the 
additional bases asserted by the issuer. This situation is typical of proposals on which issuers requested 
no action relief in the 2000’s. The Staff found other bases for exclusion appropriate over two-thirds of 
the time that another basis was asserted by the issuer in addition to relevance.) 
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